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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL WINSNESS AND ASSO-
CIATES, A Partnership, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS, 
INC., A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15501 
This is an action brought by plaintiff against defendant 
corporation relating to a lease of a service station in Delle, 
Utah. Plaintiff-lessor alleged that defendant-lessee breached 
the leasing agreement by failing to keep the service station 
open for 24 hours a day, by incorrectly reporting the number 
of gallons pumped in the station during certain months, by 
failing to construct a sewage lagoon, by failing to keep the 
premises in good repair, and for punitive damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A jury trial commenced in Tooele County on June 14, 1977 
before the Honorable Peter F. Leary of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict. After four days of testimony plaintiff concluded hj.s 
case. Defendant then moved for a directed verdict as to all 
five counts. The court directed a verdict as to the second, 
third, fourth, and fifth causes of action and reserved the first 
-1-
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cause of action for later determination. (Transcript, herein-
after Tr., pp. A-45 to A-47). 
Subsequently, the trial court directed a verdict as to 
the first cause of action and dismissed the jury. (Tr., pp. 
533-535). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks a new trial as to its first and 
third causes of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 24, 1971 a lease was entered into be~ween Carl 
Winsness and Associates, plaintiff-appellant, and M. J. Conoco 
q 
Distributors, Inc., defendant-respondent. (Exhibit, hereinafter 
Ex. 5). The lease concerned a service station in Delle, Utah 
which is 72 miles east of Wendover and 51 miles west of Salt 
Lake. ( Tr . , p • 3 4 ) • 
In 1972 a dispute arose between the plaintiff and defen-
dant as to the interpretation of this leasing agreement. An 
action was filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele 
County, Civil No. 7761, by plaintiffs asking for certain reme-
dies against defendant. Plaintiff charged that the defendant 
had failed to maintain 24-hour-a-day service, had failed to 
pay rent as provided in the contract, and had failed to build 
a sewage lagoon as agreed upon in the leasing contract. 
After extensive negotiation a stipulation was entered into 
between the parties supposedly resolving these issues. (Ex. 
P-6). The stipulation was signed on April 5, 1974 and a judg-
ment was entered in accordance with the stipulation by the 
Honorable Gordon Hall on April 22, 1974. (Ex. P-7). 
-2-
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Approximately 1-1/2 years after the stipulation and judg-
ment had been entered in the previous action plaintiff was forced 
to file the present action. Basically the same complaints were 
repeated in plaintiff's initial four causes of action. The first 
cause alleged that defendant had breached its rental agreement 
by failing to maintain the station on a 24-hour basis and that 
because plaintiff was to be paid rent based upon the number of 
gallons sold at the station that plaintiff had suffered a finan-
cial loss of not less than $20,000. 
The second cause of action demanded an accounting of the 
number of gallons sold during the period based upon information 
and belief that incorrect amounts were being reported to the 
plaintiff. The third cause of action alleged damages for fail-
ure to complete a sewage lagoon system as provided in the sti-
pulated judgment of 1974 and sought damages of $250 a month 
for the reasonable rental of a restaurant which could not be 
constructed until the lagoon was complete. Finally, the fourth 
cause of action alleged that the service station was not kept 
in good repair and that plaintiff was entitled to damages. {Re-
cord, hereinafter R., pp. 20-1). 
An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff on March 22, 
1976 adjusting the amount of damages as to the first four counts 
and adding a fifth cause of action for punitive damages alleg-
ing that defendant intentionally and willfully violated the 
terms of the lease. {R., pp. 79-76). 
On March 30, 1976 defendant filed an answer to the amended 
complaint and a counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged that 
-3-
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plaintiff interrupted defendant's right of quiet enjoyment of 
the premises and also alleged that plaintiff interfered with 
defendant's efforts to construct the lagoon. Finally, defen-
dant sought runilive damages against plaintiff for the alleged 
intentional interference and obstruction against defendant. 
(R., pp. 81-80). 
On February 2, 1977 a preliminary pre-trial order was 
made by Judge Peter F. Leary at which time plaintiff's second 
cause of action for an accounting was dismissed subject to 
amendment. The pre-trial order also disposed of several mo-
tions made by both parties and requested memoranda as to cer-
tain legal issues. (R., pp. 245-243). 
On February 10, 1977 a third amended complaint was filed 
by plaintiff extensively revising and clarifying the initial 
claims of plaintiff made in the previous two complaints and 
amending the second cause of action to a claim for damages re-
sulting from incorrect reporting of gasoline sales. (R.' pp. 
279-271). 
On April 4, 1977 a pre-trial order was entered by the 
Honorable Peter Leary holding, among other things, that plain-
tiff's third a.mended complaint could not be filed except as to 
the second cause of action and also holding that plaintiff's 
third cause of action relating to the failure to complete the 
lagoon system incorrectly stated the measure of damages as beir.= 
loss of rental from the uncompleted restaurant. Rather, the 
court ruled that the correct measure of damages was the cost 
to complete the construction of t.'1e lagoon. (R., pp. 303-30: 
-4-
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Subsequently, on May 27, 1977 defendant moved for leave 
:o file an amended counterclaim and answer. (R., pp. 387-381). 
AccorGingly, the court allowed an amended answer to be filed 
o~t denied an amended counterclaim. (R., p. 389). 
On June 14, 1977 a jury trial was commenced before the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary at the Tooele County Courthouse. At 
the time of trial five causes of action remained against the 
defendant. The first cause of action claimed that because de-
fendant failed to keep the station open 24 hours as provided 
in the original lease agreement and in the prior judgment, 
plaintiff was financially damaged in that the rent was depen-
dent upon the number of gallons sold per day. 
The second cause of action claimed that defendant had 
wrongfully reported the correct number of gallons pumped each 
day and therefore plaintiff was damaged by the loss of the cor-
rect amount owing under the rental agreement. 
The third cause of action was based upon the defendant's 
failure to complete the sewage lagoon as required in the lease 
agreement and stipulated judgment and for damages in accordance 
with the trial court's previous ruling based upon construction 
costs. The fourth cause of action claimed damages for fail-
ing to keep the station in good repair and the fifth cause of 
action claimed punitive damages for intentionally and knowingly 
,. violating the lease and the prior judgment of 1974. 
Trial was commenced and plaintiff put on numerous wit-
~esses and offered numerous exhibits in support of these alle-
~at~sns. Since this appeal primarily rests upon the sufficiency 
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of evidence, plaintiff-appellant will not restate the evidence 
offered during the trial at this time but will extensively re-
view the evidence as to each cause of action dismissed by the 
trial court infra. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence defendant moved 
for a directed verdict as to all five counts. The court granted 
a directed verdict as to the fifth cause of action, the fourth 
cause of action, the third cause of action, and the second cause 
of action. The court reserved its ruling as to the first cause 
of action until further arguments. (Tr., pp. A-45 to A-47). 
On the following day the court directed a verdict as to 
the first cause of action stating that there was no clear evi-
dence as to the amount of damage. (Tr., p. 533) . The counter-
claim of defendant was dismissed upon stipulation of the par-
ties. (Tr., p. A-48). 
Plaintiff appeals from this directed verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VER-
DICT AS TO COUNTS 1 AND 3 OF PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case the trial court di-
rected a verdict in favor of defendant and against plaintiff 
on the basis that no prima facie case had been made by the 
plaintiff with regard to the fifth, fourth, third, and second 
causes of action. (Tr., p. A-45). Subsequently, the court 
also directed a verdict as to the first cause of action. (Tr., 
p. 533). 
-6-
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Appellant will admit for purposes of this appeal that the 
trial court was probably correct in directing a verdict as to 
the second cause of action (the alleged incorrect reporting of 
gallonage), the fourth cause of action (damage allegedly caused 
by disrepair of the station), and the fifth cause of action 
(punitive damages). While there was some evidence as to each 
of these allegations it was probably not of a sufficient quan-
tity or quality to merit jury submission. 
However, the first cause of action (damages from closure 
of the station) and the third cause of action (damage from 
failing to complete the lagoon system) were legally sufficient 
for submission to the jury and the court committed error in 
directing a verdict as to these counts. 
This Court in Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 
458 (1962) clearly delineated the standard to be applied in re-
viewing a directed verdict. This Court said: 
The issue of concern here is whether, re-
viewing the evidence and all inferences 
fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, a prima 
facie case ..• was made out. 375 P.2d at 
459. 
Likewise, in Flynn v. w. P. Harlin Construction Company, 29 Utah 
2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973) this Court stated that the trial 
court should not take a case from a jury where there is any sub-
stantial dispute in evidence on issues of fact and that the 
court can only do so when the matter is so plain that there is 
no conflict in evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ. 
The court in Flynn quoted with approval the statement of 
Justice Frick in an early decision which said: 
-7-
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[I]f ..• the court is in doubt whether rea-
sonable men, ... might arrive at different 
conclusions, then this very doubt determines 
the question to be one of fact for the jury 
and not one of law for the court. 509 P.2d 
at 361 citing Newton v. Oregon Short Line 
Co., 134 P. 567 (1913). 
A review of the evidence in light most favorable to the 
plaintiff will show without doubt that plaintiff produced suf-
ficient evidence to preclude a directed verdict as to his first 
and third causes of action. 
A. There was Ample Evidence to Allow the Jury to Conclude 
that a Breach of Contract Occurred by the Closure of the Service 
Station and Sufficient Reliable Evidence was Presented to Allow 
the Jury to Determine Resulting Damages. 
This lawsuit emanated from a service station lease execu-
ted on November 24, 1971 between plaintiff, Carl Winsness and 
Associates, lessor, and defendant, M. J. Conoco Distributing, 
Inc., lessee. The pertinent provisions of this lease as it re-
lates to the first cause of action are as follows: First, para-
graph 2 provided a monthly "gallonage rental" of all gasoline 
at a rate of $.04 per gallon in the summer and $.02 per gallon 
in the winter. Second, paragraph 19 states that neither party 
shall control the other party's business operation but that 
"The obligations of the parties are expressly confined to the 
performance of the terms and conditions of this lease." Finally, 
paragraph 24 concerned hours of the station: 
It is agreed between the parties that the 
service station as provided herein shall 
be operated on a 24-hour ba~is and shall be 
open at all times to the public. (Ex. P-5) 
In 1972 a lawsuit was commenced in Tooele County by plain-
tiff against defendant on basically the same grounds as the 
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present suit. One contention of plaintiff at that time was 
defendant's failure to keep the service station open for the 
24-hour period agreed to in the leasing document. On February 
26 and February 27 of 1973 a trial was held before the Honor-
able Gordon Hall concerning plaintiff's complaint. (Tr., p. 
38). Before judgment, however, a stipulation was entered into 
between the parties and subsequently reduced to a stipulated 
judgment. (Ex. P-6 and P-7). 
The judgment signed by Judge Hall provided that the lease 
of November 24, 1971 would remain in full force and effect 
"except as specifically modified by the Stipulations and Agree-
ments as herein contained". Because of the gas shortage during 
that year and the difficulty in obtaining gasoline from any 
source the parties entered into a modification of the 24-hour 
provision of the original lease. The following modification is 
contained in the judgment: 
It is agreed between the parties that the ser-
vice station provided herein shall be operated 
on a 24-hour basis at all times to the public 
except if the following conditions and events 
occur. 
1. That the Federal or State or local 
governments by law require the closing of the 
service station certain hours or days due to 
a shortage of petroleum products or to con-
serve the same or 
2. If gasoline from Continental Oil or 
the suppliers for M. J. Conoco, Inc. are on a 
quota or allocation basis by virtue of exist-
ting government regulations and the quota or 
allocation is below the 1972 sales of 452,045 
gallons of gasoline for the Delle Service Sta-
tion, and M. J. Conoco, Inc. providing the 
allocation or quota has been sold for the pre-
vious and monthly accounting period of the . 
lease, can regulate the hours of the operating 
-9-
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of t~e service station, providing it pro-
portions the allocation or quota of gasoline 
for the next month over the number of days 
that the_service station can be opened, but 
the service station must be open at least 8 
hours each day. The station must be open 
each day until the allocation is sold and 
if not sold then the station must be open 
the next day a sufficient hours and succeed-
ing days until the quota or allocation is 
sold. That in the allocation of gasoline or 
petroleum products M. J. Conoco will use its 
best effort to obtain petroleum products and 
gasoline at all times, and will treat all of 
its service stations under the allocation or 
quota equally, will apply surplus allocations 
or from the closing of other service stations 
proportionally to the Delle Service Station 
if existing Law and Government Regulations 
permit and will treat the Delle Service Sta-
tion fairly in reference to all other ser-
vice stations which it services or operates 
or distributes petroleum products to. (Ex. 
P-7, PP· 5-6). (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the closure of the service station was not a new 
question which was raised by plaintiff in the instant case but 
had been an ongoing controversy since 1972 and a constant frus-
tration. 
Plaintiff offered ample evidence to show that the provi-
sion requiring the station to remain open for 24 hours a day 
was not being met. Plaintiff testified that during the month 
of May in 1974 he went to Delle, Utah approximately eight times 
and found the station closed three of these times mostly on sun·· 
days. (Tr., p. 43). He stated that he contacted Dick Miller, 
president of the defendant, who assured him he would correct 
the situation. In June, however, he found the station closed 
again. (Tr., pp. 44-45). 
In November of 1974 he met with defendant's officers and 
again complained that the station was not open. Stan Muir, a 
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partner in defendant, stated to him, "Fine, we• 11 take care of 
it. You don't have to worry about it." (Tr., p. 47). 
During the Christmas holidays that year plaintiff found 
the station closed a number of times including a period of four 
consecutive days. (Tr., p. 48). In the early part of 1975 he 
also found the station closed repeatedly. (Tr., p. 50). 
On January 7, 1975 plaintiff's attorney wrote to Richard 
Miller and stated, "We intend to hold you for all damages, for 
loss of sales in reference to gasoline and furthermore notify 
you that we immediately demand that the service station be kept 
open 24 hours a day". (Ex. P-55). This letter was followed by 
subsequent letters of April 11, 1975 (Ex. P-56) and April 14 
(Ex. P-58). 
In March of 1976 plaintiff called Lynn Kirkham who worked 
at M. J. Conoco and complained about the station being closed. 
(Tr., p. 52). On March 9, 1976 plaintiff's attorney again 
wrote to defendant and stated: 
This is to further notify you that my clients 
have informed this office that they have never 
agreed at any time to allow you not to keep 
the station open for 24 hours or waive the 24 
hour provision and we have sent notice after 
notice to you in reference to this matter. 
(Ex. P-60). . 
Finally, a letter was sent August 4, 1976 again reiterating the 
terms of the lease and asking for compliance. (Ex., p. 61). 
Plaintiff testified as to various pictures taken through-
out the years and how the station was closed in each instance 
even when the sign on the door said OPEN. (See Exhibits P-9, 
P-10, P-18, P-19, P-20, P-26, P-28, and P-29; Tr., pp. 54-79). 
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Mildred Sims testified that she was the lessee of the 
adjoining restaurant and operated it from 1973 until 1976. 
(Tr., p. 174). She stated that initially the restaurant was 
kept open for 24 hours but because the station was not kept 
continuously open people on the highway could not see the fa-
cility from the road and she thus decided to close as she was 
doing no business. (Tr. , p. 177) . 
In 1974 Mrs. Sims called Lynn Kirkham herself and repor-
ted that the station had been closed for as long as two or 
three consecutive days. He told her he would do something 
about it but didn't. (Tr., p. 179). She stated that she used 
to have a doctor's appointment every Thursday morning and that 
many a Thursday morning she would pull into the station and 
the station would be closed. (Tr. , p. 18 3 ) • 
In the wintertime she testified that she would be awakenec 
constantly by people wanting gas and that she even drained her 
own car to help them. (Tr., p. 185). Mrs. Sims testified 
that many people became angry because the service station was 
closed and that she had numerous confrontations during the 
three years with upset travelers. (Tr., pp. 210-211). Fin-
ally, she stated that while most of her business occurred dur-
ing the weekends that this was the time when the station was 
usually closed. (Tr. , p . 212 ) . 
Pla~ntiff called William Woffinden who had been a highway 
patrolman for 10-1/2 years assigned to the Wendover Road. (Tr. 
p. 214). He stated that the station was hardly ever open on 
nightshifts and that on weekends some of the help who were 
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hired would leave as soon as the boss drove out of the drive-
way. (Tr., p. 222). 
The officer further stated that the service station was 
closed much of the time before midnight (Tr., p. 234) and that 
if the lights of the service station were not on the Delle Com-
plex could not be seen by eastbound freeway traffic. (Tr., p. 
24 3) • 
With regard to the gas shortage the officer testified 
that in 1974 the traffic was reduced but that at the time of 
trial it had picked up to its normal pace and in fact was hea-
vier than ever. (R., p. 235). He also stated that a service 
station known as "Teddy Bear's Service" in Knolls was doing 
its best business that year and he could not see why Delle could 
not do the same if the hours were also the same. (Tr., p. 239). 
Myron Baird, vice president of Teddy Bear's Service Sta-
tion, testified that he frequently went by the service station 
during the time period in question and that while it was open 
every time during the day it was closed after 8:00 p.m. 
Richard Miller, defendant's former president, was called 
to testify by plaintiff and stated he remembered being told 
twice by plaintiff that the station was not open. (Tr., p. 413). 
He could not remember receiving any of the letters sent by plain-
tiff's attorney. (Tr., pp. 416-418). 
Jack Woods testified that he worked as a gasoline service ~ 
station attendant in the facility between October, 1974 and 
March of 1975. (Tr., p. 435). He stated that the service sta-
tion was closed about SO per cent of the time when he arrived 
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for his shift. (Tr., p. 436). He further testified that on 
Saturdays the station would not be open until about 1:30 p.m. 
because of errands he had to run. (Tr . , p . 4 3 8 ) • 
Thus, while it is true that plaintiff did not have a log 
showing the operation of the station during each hour of the 
disputed period it is clear that the evidence was sufficient 
to show that the service station was not being kept open on a 
24-hour-a-day basis as provided in the stipulation and lease 
agreement. Although the estimates of the witnesses varied as 
to the amount of time the station was actually closed and as 
to the days and hours, the jury could have chosen to believe 
any, all, or none of the witnesses. Of course, the jury never 
had this opportunity. 
As to the amount of damages sustained by the closure, 
plaintiff first attempted to introduce Exhibit 35 which was 
a breakdown of the number of gallons sold each month in 1972. 
Plaintiff testified that during this year the gas station was 
open on a 24-hour basis. (Tr., p. 96). As will be discussed 
infra the trial court committed serious error in failing to 
admit Exhibit 35 into evidence since such exhibit provided a 
past history of the service station's sales upon which a solid 
foundation could be based for an estimation of damages occur-
ring from the early closures. 
However, even without this exhibit there was sufficient 
Delbert 
evidence for a jury to conclude the amount of damages. 
Taylor was called by the plaintiffs as an expert witness in 
gasoline marketing. The witness owned his own service sta-
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tions and had worked for several years as a district sales 
representative for Husky Oil. As such, it was his responsi-
bility to investigate marketing potential of various service 
station locations and to predict how much money could be made 
under varying circumstances. (Tr., pp. 444-449). Mr. Taylor 
worked in this capacity for eight years. (Tr., p. 450). 
He testified that it was his job to estimate income and 
gallonage of existing service stations to see if they were 
operating at full capacity. He stated that his estimates of 
gallonage were usually within 2 to 3 per cent of the amount 
actually pumped. (R., p. 450). 
He further testified that he had been by the Delle Complex 
about 250 times. In 1971 and again in 1973 his company was in-
terested in placing a station in the vicinity of Delle. Ac-
cordingly he made projections in both years based upon the Delle 
station. 
The witness stated that in considering a projection for 
gas sales he considered several factors. The first was the lo-
cation of the station including its nearness to a freeway, its 
access, its visibility, and the probability that traffic would 
stop there because of its distance from other service stations. 
(Tr. I p • 4 5 2 ) • 
The next consideration was the traffic count obtained 
from the Utah Highway Department of Transportation. The wit-
ness studied the Delle traffic volume of 1971, 1973, 1974, 
1975, and 1976. (Tr., pp. 452-453). The witness stated that 
i~ 1974 there were an average of 3,050 cars going by the sta-
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tion daily. (Tr., p. 459). The Department of Transportation 
study also showed that there was a definite increase in traf-
fic from 1974 to 1976 with 1974 being slightly less than nor-
mal because of the gas shortage. (Tr., p. 460). 
Based upon these studies and his own experience Mr. Taylor 
stated that in his estimation there was sufficient traffic to 
keep the station open 24 hours a day. (Tr., p. 462). He sta-
ted that the location of the station was especially good be-
cause cars which had left Elko were beginning to run out of 
gas near the Delle station. (Tr., pp. 465-466). 
Finally, the witness stated that based upon all of these 
factors and his own personal experience with the location, it 
was his opinion that the station would pump three times as 
much gas as the present gallonage reported if the station were 
to remain open 24 hours a day. (Tr., pp. 469-470). 
He concluded that the sporadic hours testified to by other 
witnesses as proposed by plaintiff's counsel in a hypothetical 
question would result in a loss of all trucking business and 
70 per cent of the potential car business. (Tr., pp. 469-470). 
Taylor estimated that based upon his projections the station 
should have been pumping about 90, 000 gallons a month for July, 
August, and September. (Tr., pp. 499-500). 
Defendant's attorney on cross-examination attempted to 
discredit Mr. Taylor's testimony by probing into a number of 
alleged inconsistencies. (Tr., pp. 471-497). During the M~ 
tion for Directed Verdict defendant's counsel argued vigorously 
to the court that Mr. Taylor's testimony was not believable ~d 
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that it was inconsistent and conflicting. Defendant's coun-
sel therefore suggested that it be discounted. (Tr., pp. A-10 
to A-14). 
Plaintiff's counsel retorted that the testimony of Taylor 
was a matter which could be believed or disbelieved by the 
jury but that it was a question for the trier-of-fact to de-
cide the credibility of his testimony. (Tr., p. A-31). Coun-
sel argued that since defendant was obligated to pay to plain-
tiff the sum of $.04 per gallon sold during the summer and 
$.02 per gallon sold during the winter that the jury had suffi-
basis to compute damages relying upon the testimony of the wit-
nesses concerning the time of closure and upon the testimony 
of Taylor relating to the number of gallons which could have 
been pumped had the station been open. (Tr., pp. A-39 to 
A-40). 
The trial court in directing the verdict on this cause 
of action stated the following: 
Now, I know what your argument is, Mr. Duffin, 
but it appears to the Court that based on the 
testimony that has been presented that if I 
submitted the matter to the jury that I would 
probably be creating more error than I'm 
going to create now, if any; and that is, I'm 
going to grant the motion for directed verdict 
as to the first cause of action. 
I have stewed about this problem and stewed 
about this problem, and I just am unable to. 
resolve it in my mind. If I can't resolve it, 
then I don't know how I can assist the jury 
in having them resolve it in their minds. 
* * * 
Now, the court, I suppose, thinks its correct. 
But I suppose the Supreme Court will have to 
decide that. 
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* * * 
I'm not making my decision, Mr. Duffin with-
out giving it extremely considerable thought. 
I'm concerned about it, and it may well be 
during some of the matter I have made some 
erroneous decisions. You're left to whatever 
remedy you may want, including a motion for 
a new trial. (Tr., pp. 533-535). 
The trial court demanded too much from the plaintiff in 
requiring exact evidence as to damages. Aside from having a 
24-hour log of the station's activity during the three years 
and a competing service station next door to gauge the number 
of cars which needed gas, plaintiff did everything possible to 
present a reasonable basis for a trier-of-fact to determine 
damages. This Court in Security Development Company v. Fedco, 
23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P.2d 706 (1969) held that damages are not 
to be denied simply because they cannot be ascertained with 
exactness. "If a reasonable basis of calculation is afforded, 
it is sufficient although the result is only approximate." 
(462 P.2d at 709). 
Likewise, in Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515 
P.2d 442 (1973), this Court stated that damages to a business 
or enterprise need only be proved with sufficient certainty 
that reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the damages were actually suffered. 
This rule is based upon the assumption that a party who 
has broken his contract will not be permitted to escape lia-
bility because of the uncertainty in the amount of damages and 
the fact that the full extent of damages for breach of contract 
must be a matter of speculation is not a ground for refusing 
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all damages. Gould v. Mountain States T 1 h e ep one and Telegraph 
company_, 309 P. 2d 802 (Utah 1957). 
This Court in the Gould case cited with approval a Vir-
ginia case which stated the philosophy behind difficult dam-
ages. That decision said: 
Shall the injured parties ... be allowed to 
recover no damages (or merely nominal), be-
cause he cannot show the exact amount with 
certain~y, though he is ready to show, to 
the satisfaction of the jury, that he has 
suffered large damages by the injury? Cer-
tainly certainty, it is true, would be thus 
attained; but it would be the certainty of 
injustice .•.. Juries are allowed to act 
upon probable and inferential as well as 
direct and positive proof. And when from 
the nature of the case, the amount of the 
damages cannot be estimated with certainty 
.. we can see no obJection to placing be-
fore the jury all the facts and circumstan-
ces of the case having any tendency to show 
damages, or their probable amount, so as to 
enable them to make the most intelligible 
and probable estimate which the nature of 
the case will admit. 309 P.2d at 806 (Em-
phasis supplied in original). 
See also Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern Photo Ma-
- --
terials Co., 273 U. s. 359 (1927). 
Likewise, any inconsistency or failure of Mr. Taylor to 
give proper consideration to various factors goes to the weight 
of the evidence and not to its admissibility. As stated by this 
Court in the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake Citv v. Matusi 
Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974) in speaking about 
expert witnesses this Court said: 
If he fails to give proper consideration or 
weight to any particular factor that ~oe~ . 
to the credibility and not to the admissibil-
ity of his evidence. If it has deficienci7s, 
they are subject ~o exposure ?n cr?ss.exami-
nation and the weight to be given it is for 
the jury. 522 P.2d at 1373. 
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For these reasons, the trial court erred in concluding 
that there was not sufficient evidence to allow the jury to 
make a conclusion as to the breach of contract and as to the 
damages. It is ironic that the trial court showed such con-
cern for the uncertainty of damages after depriving the jury 
of Exhibit 35 which showed the amount of gallons sold in 1972 
during a 24-hour-day operating period. The court created more 
difficulties in already difficult areas by omitting this exhi-
bit as will be discussed infra. 
B. There was Ample Evidence to Allow the Jury to Con-
clude that a Breach of Contract Occurred by the Failure of 
Defendant to Complete the Lagoon System and Sufficient Relia-
ble Evidence was Presente1 to Allow the Jury to Determine 
Resulting Damages. 
Plaintiff's third cause of action involved a claim based 
upon the defendant's failure to complete a functional sewage 
lagoon system. This system was to be used by the plaintiff in 
operation of a new restaurant to be built where the footings 
had already been poured. Once again, it is necessary to exam-
ine the language of the original lease agreement and the sub-
sequent modification in the 1974 judgment. 
The lease provided in Section 4-C the following clause: 
Sewage. Lessee shall supervi~e.t~e construc-
tion of a septic tank and fac1l1t1es on the 
premises of sufficient capacity to serve both 
of the respected facilities of the parties. 
All maintenance and repair expenses incurred 
after installation of the septic tank system 
shall be shared equally by the parties hereto. 
(Ex. P-5, p. 3). 
Testimony at the time of trial showed that even as the lease 
· f "sept1· c tank" it was contemplated agreement spoke in terms o a 
System W ould have to be installed. by the parties that a lagoon 
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(Tr., pp. 116, 122, 174). In fact, approval for the lagoon 
system had already been made by the State Department of Health 
one month before the service station lease was executed. (Tr., 
p. 252; Ex. P-5). 
The stipulated judgment entered in 1974 went into great 
detail about the construction of the lagoon: 
That Carl Winsness and Associates shall fur-
nish to defendant at no cost an easement and 
sufficient land to allow a lagoon system to 
be constructed upon the premises of Carl Wins-
ness and Associates at Delle, Utah, said la-
goon system is to serve defendant's existing 
service station and the new restaurant to be 
constructed in the future by Carl Winsness. 
Carl Winsness agrees to obtain and deliver, 
at his own expense, to defendant a legal des-
cription and mutually satisfactory easement 
or easements covering the real property under-
lying the lagoon system and its appurtenant 
facilities, said legal description and ease-
ments are to be provided by Winsness to defen-
dant upon determination and mutual acceptance 
by the parties of a location for the lagoon 
system. It is expressly understood that the 
lagoon system is to serve the defendants ser-
vice station and the new restaurant to be 
built by Carl Winsness only and that no other 
facilities or improvements will be connected 
to said lagoon system except other facilities 
mutually agreed upon at the new site, which 
will not overload the lagoon system. 
3. The lagoon system provided for under the 
terms of this stipulation shall be designed 
and constructed at the sole expense and cost 
of defendant. Said lagoon system will be con-
structed in a square configuration which 
square shall be 20 feet wider than the width 
of the ponds presently engineered by Nielsen 
and Maxwell Engineers. The lagoon system 
shall be designed and constructed to comply 
with the rrunimum requirements of the State of 
Utah and the County of Tooele. All expenses 
and costs of maintenance and operation of the 
lagoon system after completion of construction 
shall be borne equally by the parties. Each 
of the parties shall bear thei: ~w~ costs of 
connecting their respected facilities to the 
pump station. 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
That defendant will commence construction of 
the lagoon system at Delle, Utah within a 
reasonable time after execution of this sti-
pulation and will complete the same within 
one year from March 8, 1974, except as may 
be excused due to acts of God, or other cau-
ses beyond the control of defendant. (Ex. 
P-7). (Emphasis added). 
It was undisputed at trial that the lagoon had not been 
finally approved by the Department of Health. Defendant took 
the position that the stipulation and judgment only required 
completion of the lagoon facility and not approval by the 
Health Department to use it. (Tr., pp. 403-407). 
Various officials from the governing health boards and 
sanitation districts testified as to the lagoon system. Nu-
merous letters from the Division of Health to the defendant 
were introduced and received into evidence. Exhibit P-39 was 
the initial approval of the lagoon system dated October 22, 
1971. Exhibit D-36 was a letter dated July 19, 1974 from plain-
tiff's attorney to the Department of Health requesting that he 
be notified whether the facility had been approved for opera-
tional use. 
Defendant's Exhibit 38 is a letter dated August 14, 1974 
from the Department of Health to defendant. The letter states 
that an inspection had been made of the premises on August 2, 
1974 and that "The inspection has indicated that the treatment 
works, as constructed, deviates from the approved plans and 
that the existing facility does not comply with the Utah Code 
of waste Disposal Regulations". Defendant was then told to 
cease the discharge of waste water in the facility until six 
specific items had been completed. A second letter of the same 
date was sent to plaintiff by the Health Department outlining 
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the existing problems. (Ex. D-37). 
On April 21, 1975 an additional letter was sent to defen-
dant by the Division of Health allowing modification of the 
original plans and noting deficiencies which still existed be-
fore approval could be made. (Ex. P-46). On August 26, 1975 
a letter was sent from the Division of Health to plaintiff's 
attorney stating the following: 
In response to your letter to us dated Au-
gust 20, 1975 inquiring as to the current 
status of the above referenced project, Mr. 
Miller of M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc. 
has informed us that the project has been 
in the finishing stages for some time now, 
with completion being delayed only by minor 
construction details to be cleared up by 
the contractor. (Emphasis added). 
Finally, on May 5, 1976 a letter was sent to defendant by 
the Division of Health stating, "As you know, the waste water 
facilities as constructed have not yet been approved by this 
office due to construction deficiencies". The letter then lis-
ted five deficiencies or modifications which were still neces-
sary for approval. (Ex. P-47). 
In addition, several pictures were offered into evidence 
and received showing the condition of the lagoon pond in May of 
1976. (Ex. P-14, P-15, and P-30). Plaintiff testified that 
he put in the foundation for the new restaurant in 1971. (Tr., 
p. 79; Ex. 31). He stated that the restaurant was not construe-
ted because the lagoon system had not been completed by defen-
dant and the restaurant could not have been made operational 
until such time. ( Tr . , pp • 81 , 14 0 , 14 2 ) • 
Plaintiff stated that he could not afford to invest $60,000 
Qf 570,000 in a new restaurant and then not use it because of 
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the unfinished lagoon. (Tr., p. 113). He stated that to com-
plete the lagoon would cost $10,000 or $15,000 and that he 
didn't feel it was his right to go in and complete the system 
when it was the defendant's obligation. (Tr . , pp . 15 2 -15 3) . 
Plaintiff also stated that he was ready, willing, and able at 
the time of trial to put in the restaurant when the lagoon was 
completed. (Tr., pp. 81-82). 
Art Maxwell, a civil engineer who originally designed the 
lagoon system, stated that after its initial design in 1971 he 
was not contacted by defendant until March of 1974 when he was 
asked to prepare an updated cost estimate of the construction. 
It should be noted that this contact occurred one month before 
the stipulation and judgment was entered. 
An estimate showing three alternatives to finishing the 
lagoon system was prepared by Mr. Maxwell and submitted to the 
defendant. (Tr., pp. 259-261; Ex. P-45). Maxwell stated that 
he had examined the ponds recently and determined that they 
were not completed according to his plans and specifications. 
Mr. Maxwell, based upon the testimony of the Department 
of Health officials and the files of the Department of Health, 
prepared an estimate as to what it would require to finish the 
construction of the lagoon and meet the requirements of the 
Division of Health. (Tr., pp. 348-356; Ex. P-51). He estimated 
the total cost to be $9,300. 
This brief summary of plaintiff's evidence shows unques-
tionably that defendant had failed to complete the lagoon sys-
tem "to comply with the minimum requirements of the State of 
Utah and the County of Tooele" as required in the Stipulation 
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and Judgment. 
The trial court took the position that since plaintiff 
had not built the new restaurant, it had not been damaged by 
the failure to complete the lagoon. (Tr., pp. A-44 to A-45). 
Accordingly, the court directed a verdict as to this cause of 
action. 
The trial court failed to recognize the fact that the 
lease, stipulated agreement, and judgment must be considered 
as a whole and not segregated into parts. 
It is apparent that plaintiff gave up certain considera-
tions and made certain concessions in exchange for those made 
by defendant. It is elementary that where each party has a 
legal benefit and legal detriment accruing to it and the con-
tract is signed the contract is supported by legal considera-
tion and that a promise for a promise is adequate legal consi-
deration to support any contract. Tucson Federal Savings and 
Loan Association v. Aetna Investment Corporation, 245 P.2d 
423 (Ariz. 1952). 
Therefore, defendant was obligated to construct the la-
goon just as plaintiff was obligated not to compete with de-
fendant. (Ex. 5, p. 8). For the trial court to conclude that 
?laintiff suffered no damages because it did not construct the 
restaurant is totally erroneous when there is nothing in the 
lease agreement making the construction of the lagoon condi-
tional upon the construction of the restaurant. 
It is clear that plaintiff was deprived of a constructed 
lagoon which had been agreed to by the defendant. Had the 
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plaintiff in the negotiation of the original lease requested 
defendant to build a statue of Abraham Lincoln in consideration 
for promises and concessions to be made by plaintiff, defen-
dant could not claim that it was not obligated to build such 
a statue just because it had no useful purpose to plaintiff. 
In effect, the trial court made this determination and complete· 
ly ignored the underlying lease agreement and stipulated judg-
ment. 
There was competent testimony offered as to the cost of 
putting the lagoon in the condition which the defendant had 
originally agreed to do by the terms of the lease and judgment. 
(Ex. P-51). The defendant, of course, could question whether 
the estimated i terns were actually necessary for "completion" 
or could question the date that such estimation would be bind-
ing. But these would be matters for cross-examination and for 
defendant's own case to be submitted to the trier of fact for 
determination. 
The trial court completely ignored the damage evidence by 
holding that the failure of plaintiff to build the restaurant 
precluded him from making any claim for damages. The court's 
reasoning in taking the matter from the jury was erroneous and 
requires reversal. 
The trial court erred in directing a verdict as to the 
first and third causes of action by failing to allow the jury 
to consider the effect that the closure of the station had upon 
plaintiff's gallonage income and by failing to allow the jury 
to consider the damages caused by the uncompleted lagoon. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EXHI-
BIT 35 FROM ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE WHEN 
IT WAS CLEARLY RELEVANT IN DETERMINING 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES. 
Exhibit 35 was an enlarged chart showing the monthly re-
ceipts of gasoline for the year, 1972. A facsimile of this 
exhibit is attached for the convenience of the Court as an 
Appendix to this brief. 
Plaintiff was allowed to introduce into evidence the gal-
lonage reported by defendant for the year 1976 (Exhibit 32), 
for the year 1975 (Exhibit 33), and for the year 1974 (Exhibit 
34). Plaintiff testified that during 1972 the station was 
operating on a 24-hour-a-day basis and that the traffic con-
ditions were not as good then as they were at the time of trial. 
(Tr., p. 96). Plaintiff then attempted to offer Exhibit 35 
into evidence but the court sustained the objection made by 
defendant's counsel. (Tr. , p . 9 7) • 
Subsequently, out of the presence of the jury, the follow-
ing dialogue occurred between counsel and the court: 
MR. DUFFIN: Cornes now the plaintiff, your 
Honor, and yesterday offered an exhibit as 
to the gallonage sold in ... 1972. It was 
not for the purpose of showing damages but 
to show prior gallonage. Mr. Winsness testi-
fied yesterday that the business that he had 
came from the west, but there was no differ-
ence in the marketing conditions in reference 
to the matter than there were at that time. 
He further testified they were open in 1972 
approximately 24 hours per day. Now, the 
legal question is not for the purpose of dam-
ages--! mean not to show that there were any 
damages in 1972--but for the purp~se ~f show-
inq past due sales for the determination of 
future profits as discussed in 22 Am.Jur .. 
Damages in Section 329. (Citations then gi-
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ven). . It goes to the weight of the evi-
dence. But as to the admissibility, that was 
the offer which I made. 
THE COURT: Well, the court's opinion is that 
the objection should still be sustained. It's 
the court's recollection that based upon the 
stipulation all matters prior to the ~ntry of 
the judgment in 1974 were--I don't know whe-
ther compromised or what, but at least they 
were resolved. So, it would be the court's 
position that your basis, any time after 1974 
are not prior thereto. 
MR. DUFFIN: I am not offering it--
THE COURT: Well, you could not put in any 
evidence of prior earnings or profits. 
MR. DUFFIN: Well, the stipulation there wasn't 
any stipulation--the stipulation agreement was 
there would be no damages for any loss prior to 
that time. I'm not offering it for that pur-
pose. I'm offering for the purpose of showing 
a regular established business which the Supreme 
Court said in the Eastman Kodak case 
THE COURT: Well, the objection will still be 
sustained. (R., pp. 133-134). (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's counsel then proffered evidence which would 
have shown that in 1972 the gallonage sold was in excess of 
502, 000 gallons and that conditions were approximately the same 
during that time period. (Tr., p. 134). Defendant's counsel 
responded that conditions were different in 1972 and listed the 
factors causing the difference. Defense counsel then stated: 
But quite apart from that, we wish the record 
to show that the stipulation is specific and 
the trial covered all of these issues previous-
ly. And a stipulation is specific that it 
bound the parties and the amount of stated dam-
ages which were settled and which were paid and 
which has heretofore by the pleadings been ad-
mitted to have been received by virtue of these--
the change in conditions from 1972 to 1974 is a 
part of the stipulation. (Tr., p. 135). 
The stipulation stated the following: 
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That Car~ Winsness and Associates and M. J. 
Conoco Distrib~tors, In~. hereby mutually 
release and waive any rights, claims or cau-
ses of action that either party may have or 
claim against the other for any alleged 
breach of anv of the terms of the written 
lease the parties dated the 24th of November 
1971 prior to the date of this stipulation. ' 
(Ex. P 6, pp. 3 4). (Emphasis added). 
The trial court seriously erred when it considered that this 
stipulation precluded the use of the 1972 gasoline sales as a 
basis for establishing damages in 1974-77 period. 
As plaintiff's counsel repeatedly told the court, Exhibit 
35 was not meant to claim damages in 1972 but was meant to use 
as a comparison for what the station could pump if it were open 
on a 24-hour basis. Defendant's argument that conditions had 
changed since 1972 again went to the weight of the evidence 
which was a question for the trier-of-fact to consider. 
It is fundamental law that evidence of prior profits in 
the same business, at least in the case of a business which has 
been established and is making a profit when the contract is 
breached, furnishes a basis, together with other facts and cir-
cumstances, for the computation of lost profits, and proof of 
such prior profits, or of the income and expenses of the busi-
ness, for a reasonable time before the interruption charged is 
allowable. 22-A C.J.S., Damages, Section 162(4), p. 86. See 
also Mack E. Company v. Pizza of Gaithersburg, 270 A.2d 645 
(Md. 1970) ("Loss of profits may be projected from past perfor-
mance, assuming that past performance has continued long enough 
to be best evidence of damages which is available"); Western 
Rebuilders and Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Felmley, 391 P.2d 383 
1 Jre. 1964) ("Past profits may be shown, as basis for recovery 
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of future profits, if they reflect operation of established 
business"). See also Eastman Kodak Company of New York v. 
Southern Photo Materials, 273 U.S. 359 (1927). 
This Court in Security Development Company v. Fedco, Inc. 
23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P.2d 706 (1969) has held that expert testi-
mony in relation to past history of sales is permissible in 
showing damages. In that case the question was whether or not 
the reduction in floor space of a lessee had damaged it by re-
ducing its gross profits. Evidence was offered as to the gross 
sales during a period of several years. This Court stated: 
There was testimony of experts to the effect 
that net profits are directly related to 
gross profits which in turn are directly 
related to gross sales. The jury, therefore, 
had evidence of a proper basis from which 
it could have determined that plaintiff's 
business was adversely affected by the depri-
vation of floor space. 462 P.2d at 706. 
Thus, the method of using previous business records to es-
tablish present damages is accepted as a legitimate method of 
proof. Had Exhibit 35 been introduced into evidence the pla~-
tiff's expert witness, Mr. Taylor, could have given much more 
credible testimony based upon the prior history of the business. 
In addition, the jurors could have decided for themselves whe-
ther the changed conditions as argued by defendants was the 
cause of the tremendous decrease in gallonage from 1972 to the 
damage period. 
The failure of the court to allow Exhibit 35 into evidence 
was especially harsh in this situation. Delle, Utah is an iso· 
lated, desolate location where no other service stations operate. 
Had the breach been in Salt Lake, for example, the business re-
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cords of stations in the vicinity that had 24-hour service 
could have been used for damage purposes. Here, however, the 
only sure method of damage computation was based on the sta-
tion's own history. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding 
this exhibit from the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented by plaintiff when viewed most 
favorably clearly establishes a sufficient basis for submit-
ting the first and third causes of action to the jury. The 
evidence was overwhelming that defendant had failed to keep 
the service station open on a 24-hour basis in spite of the 
previous stipulated judgment in 1974. There was also suffi-
cient expert testimony correlating the hours of operation with 
the number of gallons sold and this testimony together with 
the fixed rate of rental per gallon as provided by the lease 
agreement would have allowed the jury to determine a damage 
figure. 
Had Exhibit 35 been admitted into evidence there could be 
no doubt that sufficient foundational proof would have been 
present for submission to the jury. The notion of the trial 
court that the previous stipulation precluded this evidence was 
clear error. The data was not offered for 1972 damages but 
only as a history for 1974-1977 damage comparisons. 
Likewise, there was ample evidence that the lagoon had 
not been "completed" by any stretch of the imagination and that 
t12 stipulated judgment required it be built to the requirements 
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of the State authorities. There was also ample damage evidence 
presented as to the completion cost of the lagoon. 
The trial court's ruling that plaintiff was precluded 
from claiming damages because the new restaurant had not been 
built was illogical and erroneous since it ignored the fact 
that the parties had made numerous concessions and demands as 
a whole and that defendant was therefore obligated to build the 
lagoon regardless of plaintiff's future plans for the restaur-
ant. In addition, there was nothing in any of the agreements 
making the restaurant a condition precedent to the completion 
of the lagoon. 
This was not a case where the defendant-lessee was being 
sued for breach of the leasing agreement. It was a case where 
defendant had already been sued in 1972 for the exact breaches 
and had agreed to rectify these breaches in a stipulated judg-
ment. The ink was hardly dry on the judgment before defendant 
began the same course of conduct. For the trial court to penal· 
ize plaintiff for being unable to prove damages with mathemati-
cal certainty or for failing to build the restaurant under 
these conditions is both incredible and unjust. 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in directing a 
verdict as to the first and third causes of action and this 
court should remand the matter to the District Court for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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1972 
GALLONAGE AT SERVICE STATION IN DELLE, UTAH 
REPORT OF M. J. CONOCO 
TO KARL W. WINSNESS & ASSN. 
January 15,397 3,198 
February 12. 924 3,769 
March 14,782 3,458 
April 19,591 5,361 
May 21,313 4,735 
June 29,199 6,966 
July 55,156 6,103 
August 98,015 3,766 
September 97,082 2,300 
October 48,494 3' 077 
November 25,440 2,162 
December 17, 732 1, 692 
TOTAL 455,125 46,587 
Total gas and Diesel 501, 712 
FACSIMILE OF EXHIBIT 35 
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